IAI
Italy-U.S. Relations

Prodi and D’Alema: Better than Expected

12 Set 2006 - Jason W. Davidson - Jason W. Davidson

On 1 March 2006 Italy’s center-right prime minister Silvio Berlusconi addressed a rare joint session of the United States Congress. Speaking in the midst of a heated electoral campaign, Berlusconi spoke about how much Italy – and the world – owed the United States. At roughly the same time Oliviero Diliberto, leader of the Italian Communist Party, said of Berlusconi’s visit “[h]e went there to shake hands that are dripping with blood.” While Berlusconi provided political support for the 2003 Iraq war and his government sent 3,000 Italians to assist the U.S. and its allies after the cessation of formal hostilities, members of the center-left coalition led by Romano Prodi frequently expressed their view that the Iraq war had been a costly mistake. Given this contrast in statements and positions, many observers were concerned that the April 2006 victory of the center-left would negatively impact relations between Italy and the U.S.

There are, however, good reasons for optimism on the prospects for relations between Italy and the U.S. under Prodi’s government. Italy’s left has a history of moderate foreign policy making and the U.S. government has recently shifted away from its more radical policies.

Italy: The Importance of a Moderate Center
Since World War II Italy’s foreign policy has attempted to maintain strong ties with the United States and its European neighbors. While the center-left tends to emphasize Europe more than the center-right, it also has a history of policymaking that has been very conducive to American interests. The center-left demonstrated its moderate credentials during the 1999 Kosovo war. Under Left Democrat Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema Italy made significant contributions of aircraft, pilots, and basing to NATO’s air campaign. Policymakers in Washington have a positive image of the center left because of Italy’s reliability during Kosovo.

The composition of Romano Prodi’s foreign policy team provides further support for the claim that his government will not veer dramatically away from the U.S. As mentioned previously, Massimo D’Alema has a history of working with Washington to achieve common goals. Since becoming foreign minister, D’Alema has stressed that Italy favors a stronger Europe as a partner to the U.S.—not a counterweight to it—and he has made clear that Rome, like Washington, believes that spreading democracy is a critical component in addressing the challenge of global terrorism. Arturo Parisi, Prodi’s defense minister, is a leading figure of the left’s largest centrist party, La Margherita. Finally, while Romano Prodi’s experience as president of the European Commission indicates that his government will be likely to embrace Europe, he has also made clear that his vision of Italy’s role in Europe in no way precludes a solid relationship with the U.S.

Some believe that the moderate stance of Prodi’s foreign policy team is irrelevant because the radical left will determine Italy’s foreign policy agenda. There is some validity to this argument as Italy’s far left has a history of criticism of United States foreign policy and much of the far left has embraced hardcore pacifism. Moreover, the governing coalition’s survival will depend on several far-left parties that embrace these ideas: the Refounded Communists, the Italian Communists, and the Greens. The situation is especially precarious in the Senate, where the government commands a very slim majority.

While the far left will provide a challenge to the Prodi government, it is not clear that the far left will dominate the foreign policy agenda. The leaders of the far left parties are aware that forcing the fall of the government would make the return of the center right more likely by hastening new elections and by providing support for the center right’s criticism that the left is incapable of holding a government together. In the post-election debate on the Italian mission in Afghanistan, to be discussed later, leaders of the far left made clear that they would not cause the collapse of the Prodi government in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives. The most serious threat from the far left will almost certainly come from “rebels” in the Senate who might defy party leaders to vote against the government. The government will have to work to keep rebellions to a minimum through minor compromises and far left party leaders will have to work to get their senators to toe the party line.

The United States: A Move Toward Moderation
If the Prodi government had taken office three years ago, there would have been less reason for optimism about relations between Italy and the U.S. After 11 September 2001 the Bush administration developed a doctrine that envisioned the use of preventive war without the necessary approval of major international institutions such as the United Nations or NATO. The doctrine was manifest in the U.S.-led Iraq War of 2003, which the Bush administration justified by the Iraqi government’s possession of weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorist groups. In the wake of the Iraq war the Bush administration’s foreign policy has changed significantly. The lengthy and violent insurgency that has plagued Iraq since the summer of 2003 seems to have led many within the administration to reconsider the wisdom of preventive war waged without the support of major international institutions.

As the financial costs of the war have soared to $300 billion and over 2,500 American soldiers have lost their lives in Iraq, the political costs of preventive war have becoming apparent: in May 2006 only thirty-one percent of Americans approved of the job George Bush was doing as President. Trenchant criticism of the Bush administration’s foreign policy from neo-conservative thinkers provides further evidence of the moderate turn in the administration’s policy. For example, former speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich recently told The Washington Post that the Bush administration has “…accepted the lawyer-diplomatic fantasy that talking while North Korea builds bombs and missiles and talking while the Iranians build bombs and missiles is progress. Is the next stage for Condi [U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] to go dancing with Kim Jong Il?” The Bush administration’s shift away from preventive, unilateral war will make a positive, productive relationship with the Prodi government more likely.

Important Issues in U.S.-Italy Relations: Afghanistan and Lebanon
The election of the Prodi government raised the question of Italy’s contribution to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Hardcore pacifist legislators from the far left parties called for a complete withdrawal of Italian forces from Afghanistan and threatened to vote against the refinancing of the mission. The center left stressed that the Italian mission is legitimate—because it was sanctioned by NATO and the United Nations—and it is providing a crucial contribution toward an important security mission. Moreover, leaders of the far-left parties (Oliviero Diliberto, Fausto Bertinotti, and Paolo Cento) stated publicly that they would not cause the government to fall if they did not achieve an Italian withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Prodi government ultimately triumphed on 28 July 2006 by attaching a confidence motion to the bill refinancing the Italian mission to Afghanistan. The far left “rebels” declared that they continued to oppose the mission but they would not to cause the government to fall by voting against the bill. The Prodi government’s willingness to face down the far-left pacifists with a confidence vote provides evidence that the government is committed to a moderate, pro-U.S. policy line—even when a moderate line is costly.

In the aftermath of Israel’s month-long war with Hezbollah over Lebanon in late August 2006, Italy pledged to send 3,000 troops—the largest contribution of any nation—to bolster the peacekeeping efforts of the existing UNIFIL force. Italian government officials have stressed that they are making this important contribution to reinforce European cooperation in international security and because the mission provides enforcement for United Nations Security Council resolution 1701. While Prodi, D’Alema and others have not framed their contribution to peace in Lebanon in pro-American terms, the American government has warmly welcomed Italy’s efforts. George Bush has publicly applauded Italy’s “significant pledge” to peace in Lebanon. In the end, Italy’s actions are more important for Italy-U.S. relations than the reasons its government officials offer for its actions and the U.S. government views Italy’s contribution to peace in Lebanon in a very positive light.

Conclusion
In sum, a good case can be made for optimism about relations between Italy and the U.S. under the Prodi government. The center left has a history of pro-American policy and the far left will probably not dominate Italian foreign policy making. Moreover, the Bush administration has moved toward more moderate policies since the Iraq war, bringing it closer to the preferences of the Prodi government. The Prodi government’s policies—on Afghanistan and Lebanon—indicate that Italy is continuing with a general policy direction that is conducive to positive Italy-U.S. relations.